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NOTES
from the remainder of the treaty, the residue should be valid.
Viewed in this light, the dictum in Power Authority of New York v.
Federal Power Commission9" seems unfortunate. Although it may be
politically inexpedient to enter treaties about a variety of subjects that
historically have been considered of purely domestic concern, there is no
judicially enforceable constitutional limitation to prevent it. What is a
proper subject for international concern depends upon the development of
international law and cooperation, and courts should not erect a standard
to test the essential validity of treaties upon this term or its converse,
domestic concern. The courts' function in reviewing essential validity,
if any, should be limited to the narrow area where it is contended that the
treaty is unlawful according to principles of international law. The
treaty-making power is a political one and in the main should be left to
the wisdom and discretion of those who are charged with its operation,
and who are responsible to the people for their conduct.
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS FROM THE USE OF CONSIGN-
MENT CONTRACTS IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
Consignment is generally used as a device to protect a vendor from
either the fraudulent bulk sales or insolvency of his vendee. Protection
is afforded the vendor by his retention of title enabling him to set aside
sales not made in the ordinary course of business and giving him sole
claim to the goods in the event of the vendee's financial failure. Gen-
erally, the consignee retains the power to set the prices and is regarded
as the bailee of the vendor for the sale of the goods. However, the
vendor may exercise such control over the prices and business of the
consignee that the consignee becomes the vendor's agent. When such
control over the consignee's prices is exercised in conjunction with a
genuine agency system of distribution, a consignment-agency plan exists,
which has been held not to constitute a violation of the antitrust laws.1 The
use of consignment raises problems which may include not only a deter-
mination as to the existence of a genuine agency but also the applicability
rights or obligations. Power Authority of New York v. Federal Power Commission,
247 F.2d 538, 541 (1957). The distinction to be noted is that the reservation in the
Niagara River Power case was directly germane to the subject-matter of the treaty and
an outgrowth of international negotiation. Id. at 549 (dissent). The illustrations, on
the other hand, are remote from the negotiations and the subject-matter of the treaty.
90. 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir), wacated as moot, 355 U.S. 64 (1957).
1. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
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of the Miller-Tydings' and McGuire' Amendments to the Sherman and
Federal Trade Commission Acts. These problems are exemplified by
the use of consignment contracts, frequently labeled "C plans," in the
petroleum industry.
In the early 1930's the major petroleum companies operated many
of their own retail outlets.' However, the major portion of the present
retail outlets are independently operated while only a small portion ope-
rate under consignment and a smaller portion are company-owned and
operated.5 Several developments brought about this complete change in
the industry pattern of distribution. Independent stations were able to
take business away from company-operated stations because prices could
be cut on shorter notice with less risk of ill will and without violating the
Clayton Act or one-price laws of a number of states.' A big factor in
some states was the severe chain store taxes imposed under laws enacted
in 1935 and thereafter.7 In addition, the companies were anxious to
eliminate the increasing responsibilities resulting from such factors as the
unionization of station employees, social security taxes, withholding fed-
eral income taxes, and wage and hour legislation. Finally, the independ-
ent operation created a semblance of independent small business' on the
2. 50 Stat 693 (1937), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952), quoted in text at note
37 infra.
3. 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (Supp. 1957), quoted in text at note 66
infra.
4. In reply to a questionnaire by the TNEC, the major oil companies reported a
total of 42,270 service station operator-managers and employees as of June 30, 1935.
Hearings Before the Temporary National Economic Committee on the Investigation of
Concentration of Economic Power, 76th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 14-A, at 7820 (1940). The
number of domestic service stations owned or leased by the major oil companies was
reported to be 75,547 for 1935. Id. at 7819.
In McLEAN AND HAIGH, THE GRoWTH OF INTEGRATED OIL COMPANIES 289 (1954),
the authors make this comment: "The withdrawal of most integrated oil companies
from the direct salary operation of service stations was one of the most significant
disintegration movements which has occurred in the history of the oil industry. Several
integrated companies began to lease their company owned and operated service stations
to private operators around 1930. In 1935 and the years immediately thereafter the
program gained momentum and spread quickly throughout the industry."
5. In 1 WHITNEY, ANTITRUST POLICIES 126 (1958), the number of stations in each
group was estimated as follows: (1) About 60,000 owned and 105,000-110,000 leased
by the dealer; (2) 8,000 on consignment; and (3) 3,000 owned by suppliers and operated
by salaried managers.
6. Id. at 125.
7. Ibid.
8. Although the major oil companies have discontinued their operation of most sta-
tions, they maintain extensive control over the stations by means of leases and oil and
gasoline supply contracts executed with the dealers. At the present time about 50% of
the stations are operated by dealers who lease their stations from their suppliers. Id. at
126. Other dealers who are not subject to control by lease frequently have oil and
gasoline supply contracts with their suppliers. Examination of sample leases and supply
contracts submitted to two Congressional subcommittees indicates that many of the
leases impose a duty on the dealer to maintain the station in a neat and orderly condi-
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retail level with a minimum investment by the companies; and, in the
majority of cases, the rent paid by the dealers exceeded the amount of
profit from integrated distribution.'
Although only about 8,000 service stations, out of approximately
181,000, are on consignment,"0 the use of C plans has increased con-
siderably in recent months. 1 Twelve major petroleum companies plus
a number of jobbers now use consignment in one form or another."
This development seems to have arisen either as a part of a genuine
agency system created for various business purposes or as a method of
gaining control over retail prices while maintaining the advantages of an
otherwise independent system of distribution. The C plans are used on
both the retail and wholesale levels.' However, since the legal problems
tend to be the same, discussion will be confined solely to the retail plans.
There is no set pattern or type of plan being used. The only common
denominator is that gasoline is always consigned to the dealer to be sold
tion and reserve a right in the supplier to re-enter and inspect at will. Both the
leases and supply contracts are for a short duration (usually one year) and in some
cases are subject to cancellation on short notice without cause. When the dealer is
under both a lease and a supply contract, termination or cancellation of one terminates
or cancels the other. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Small Business oi a Study of Petroleum Marketing Practices in New Jersey, 84th Cong.,
1st and 2d Sessions, pt. 3, at 461-89, 498-537, 542-60, 569-77, 591-600, and 610-32 (1956) ;
Hearings oi H. Res. 56 Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on Small
Business oi Distribution Practices in the Petroleum Industry, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.
1, at 246, 263, 320, 398; pt. 2, at 45; pt. 3, at 82, 121 (1957). The potentiality of having
their lease and supply contracts cancelled on short notice and the inability to liquidate
their investments in TBA (approximately $3,000-$5,000) tends to force dealers under
lease to accept "suggestions" by their lessor-suppliers; and, the difficulty of acquiring
gasoline and oil from another supplier on short notice places a similar, although more
limited, pressure on dealers who are under supply contracts but not leases. Indeed, a
vice-president of Shell Oil Co. commented that: "We are in an industry that is in ef-
fect an integrated operation, starting at the wellhead, to the refinery, to the pump for
the consumer." H.R. REP. No. 1423, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1955). The subcommit-
tee before which this statement was made agreed. Id. at 2. Similar control over dealers
has been exercised by the use of franchise agreements in the automobile industry. See
HEwiTr, AUTOMOBILE FRANCHIsE AGREEMENTS (1956).
9. Surveys conducted by the oil companies indicate that, based upon the rental
which an independent dealer would have to pay, the companies in the majority of cases
cannot operate their own stations on the margin available to retail dealers without suf-
fering a net loss. The willingness to work longer hours and ability to operate the sta-
tions on less manpower were among the factors which enabled the independent dealers
to make a profit while paying rent in addition to the expenses paid by company sta-
tions. McLEAN AND HAIGH, THE GROWTH OF INTEGRATED OIL COMPANIES 499-501
(1954). Testimony presented to a house subcommittee was in accord. H. R. REP. No.
1423, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1955).
10. See note 5 supra.
11. See National Petroleum News, July 1956, p. 93.
12. Ibid.
13. See Ibid. and National Petroleum News, August 1957, p. 111.
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at a price fixed by the company with the dealer receiving a commission
which may or may not vary with such price.'4
Since the purposes for the use of C plans tend to differ according to
whether the plans are used in a permanent or an "off and on again" man-
ner, the plans must be examined accordingly. Although some new dealers
who desire to lease a company-owned station are required to go on con-
signment for a few months in order to measure their capabilities, most
dealers who are placed on permanent plans remain on consignment."5
The considerations which prompt such plans cause each company's plan
to be generally uniform. But the plans of the different companies vary
considerably." Some companies consign all products while others con-
sign only gasoline. The operating expenses of the station are assumed
in varying degrees. In addition to the risks of doing business, 7 a com-
pany must consider possible tort liability, workmen's compensation cover-
age, social security taxes, the withholding of federal income taxes, chain
store taxes, and the necessary bookkeeping expenses associated with the
foregoing responsibilities.
The extent to which these responsibilities are assumed seems to de-
pend upon the purpose or purposes for which the permanent plan is used.
If the purpose of the plan is to provide a test of sales potential for the
determination of the proper rental value of a new station, to maintain
high standards at "show-spot" stations, or to test the capabilities of new
dealers, the company probably will find it more desirable to assume all
responsibilities in order to maintain complete control over the station
operation. On the other hand, if the purpose is either to make dealer-
ships available to men who otherwise could not raise the necessary capi-
tal, or merely to gain control over the prices' 8 of a station, the company
14. National Petroleum News, July 1956, p. 95.
15. Ibid.
16. See Ibid. which discusses four actual plans considered representative of the
types being used.
17. Rent, wages, and general overhead expenses are the risks to be considered.
However, the method by which these expenses are paid will determine whether or not
any risk to the dealer exists. See text accompanying note 82 infra for a discussion of
this point.
18. The importance of retail prices and other aspects of the retail market to the
major oil companies is indicated by the following statement of a vice-president of Texas
Co.: ". . . the oil industry works in a continuous flow from the well all the way to the
last 10 feet of gasoline hose at the service station. If anything interferes with the opera-
tion at the last 10 feet, the entire costly operation is tied in knots. That is why we
must have assured outlets. That is why we cannot be deprived of the right, or relieved
of the responsibility, to see that our products get to the customers." H. R. REP. No.
1423, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1955). This importance of retail markets to the major
oil companies points out the dual character of such markets.
In an immediate sense they are the arenas for competition among local
service stations, and for the emergence of primarily local aspects of retailers'
marketing policies. In a broader sense they are the primary ground for the
NOTES
undoubtedly will not assume extensive responsibilities."
The circumstances surrounding the use of a permanent consignment
plan may indicate the purpose or purposes for its use. For example,
consignment can be used at strategically located stations as a means of
instigating price wars in order to increase a company's share of the total
volume sold in the area. Similarly, consignment can be used as a rela-
tively effective means of maintaining maximum dealer margins in any
given area. In this latter respect, if consignment is used at all stations, it
is more effective than attempted control by means of wholesale tank
wagon prices. Consignment is not subject to the dealer's discretion as
to his retail price and source of supply,2" or to Robinson-Patman Act2
meeting in competition of the integrated refiners and for the determination of
the general level of domestic gasoline and lubricant prices. Thus we have the
mixed phenomenon in local retail markets of direct rivalry among major and
other integrated refiners intermingled with a purely local sort of competition
among major integrated retail outlets, other integrated outlets, and independent
outlets handling both major and minor gasoline. 1 BAIN, THE ECONOMICS OF
THE PACIFIC COAST PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 199 (1944). See to the same effect
CASSADY & JONES, THE NATURE OF COMPETITION IN GASOLINE DISTRIBUTION
AT THE RETAIL LEVEL 116-19 (1951).
19. See National Petroleum News, July 1956, p. 95, which discusses four actual
plans and the reasons assigned by the respective companies for the use of each.
20. This discretion will be non-existent if the dealer is unable to deviate from the
retail market price because of the proximity of competing stations or unable to pur-
chase from others, and if the other companies do not change their tank wagon price
thereby effectuating a similar change in the retail market price. The non-brand dealer
will most likely be the only type of dealer to change suppliers in the absence of a sub-
stantial drop in the margin because the brand dealer will be precluded by his supply
contract (and possibly by his lease, if he leases from his supplier) from using the sup-
plier's brand name on his signs except when the supplier's products are purchased.
21. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b (1952). This Act provides, in part:
Sec. 2 (a) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in com-
merce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to dis-
criminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade
and quality . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of
either of them: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differ-
entials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manu-
facture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in
which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered. ...
(b) Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this
section, that there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities
furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing
justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this section,
and unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission is author-
ized to issue an order terminating the discrimination: Provided, however, That
nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case
thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or fa-
cilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an
equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a
competitor.
(c) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in
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complications which would necessarily result if the independent dealer's
discretion were to be eliminated by means of discriminating against
those dealers who refused to sell at the company's price.
The nature of "off and on again" C plans differs markedly from
permanent C plans. "Off and on again" plans are temporary and are
generally offered to all of a company's dealers in a competitive area, but
only during severe price wars.2 2 Such plans enable a company to grant
relief to efficient dealers who lack the capital to remain solvent during
a severe price war. But, since there are other methods of achieving the
foregoing result without controlling the dealers' prices, the main reason
for "off and on again" C plans is the direct control which the company
acquires over the consignee-dealers' prices. Such plans may be used by
a company as a device for maintaining or increasing its share of the
total gasoline sales by all companies. In this respect, a company may
use consignment defensively or offensively as a means of instigating a
price war.2" Due to the legal uncertainty of "off and on again" plans,
a company will tend to assume only those business responsibilities deemed
necessary to avoid antitrust violations.
the course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything
of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or
discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the sale
or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other party to such
transaction or to an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where
such intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct
or indirect control, of any party to such transaction other than the person by
whom such compensation is so granted or paid.
22. See National Petroleum News, July 1956, p. 95.
23. An example of the defensive use of consignment occurs when a company
lowers its price to maintain its share of the market volume following a prior reduction
by another major or independent. Consignment is more effective than attempted con-
trol by means of reducing the wholesale tank wagon price to the dealers because con-
signment is not subject to the dealer's discretion as to retail price.
The offensive use of consignment to instigate a price war may be based upon a
company's desire to increase its share of market sales or to dump an oversupply of
gasoline on the market without suffering a loss of its share of market sales. The
method of unloading excessive gasoline must be more indirect when consignment is not
used. In the absence of company operated or C stations, the company cannot force the
dealers to reduce prices at their retail outlets in the hope that a greater share of the
market can be temporarily acquired while eliminating the oversupply of gasoline. In-
stead, the company will have to sell to non-brand dealers (probably through brokers) ;
and, when the non-brand dealers cut their price in an attempt to increase their per cent
of the market, the brand dealers will probably agree to meet the competition in ex-
change for a discount which partially covers their lower margin-the result is that
(1) the non-brand dealer does not gain a permanent advantage, (2) additional gasoline
is moved through both brand and non-brand outlets, and (3) part of the cost of this
operation is borne by the brand dealer. Under consignment, the foregoing operation
can be used with the assurance that the competition from the non-brand dealers will be
met by the company's brand outlets; or, if sale through non-brand outlets is impossible,
the company can attempt to unload the oversupply only through its own outlets. See
H. R. REP. No. 1423, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1955).
NOTES
The possible uses of an "off and on again" plan as a means of con-
trolling retail prices and thereby increasing a company's gasoline sales
in the market are illustrated by a recent Federal Trade Commission com-
plaint against the Sun Oil Company.24 The complaint charges that Sun's
use of a C plan in the Norfolk-Portsmouth-Virginia Beach area of Vir-
ginia constituted an unfair method of competition in violation of Sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.25 The facts underlying
the complaint are indicated by testimony before a Congressional sub-
committee.2" According to this testimony, Sun Oil had twenty-six serv-
ice stations in that area in November 1956, of which nine were company-
operated. Sun Oil representatives informed the seventeen independent
dealers that Sun intended to lower the price of gasoline at all company-
operated stations. In addition, the dealers were informed that they would
not be given a voluntary allowance or any other form of subsidy, but
that they could obtain the help of Sun by accepting a C plan. Under this
plan, Sun would fix the retail price and the dealer would be guaranteed
4Y2 cents commission regardless of the extent to which the prices de-
clined. The guaranteed commission was less than the normal dealer mar-
gin. This situation forced the dealers either to become consignees or to
compete against their own supplier without any assistance in the ensuing
price war. In addition the importance of the retail prices to the com-
pany's marketing policies2" may have caused some dealers who would
have preferred to remain independent to fear that the company would
retaliate by cancelling their lease or supply contracts.29 As a result of
24. Sun Oil Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. f 26839 (1957).
25. 38 State. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952) provides in part: "Un-
fair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
commerce, are declared unlawful."
26. Hearings on H. Res. 56, supra note 8, pt. 1, at 300-01.
27. The temporary voluntary allowance which is a discount from the tank wagon
price is the subsidy normally given to dealers during intensive price disturbances to en-
able them to compete against price cutters. See CASSADY, PRICE MAKING AND PRICE
BEHAVIOR IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 228 (1954). An adjustment in the rent charged
to the dealer is another subsidy which can be used in such situations. The granting of
such discounts may violate antitrust laws. In a recent complaint the FTC charges that
in the Norfolk-Portsmouth-Virginia Beach area Texas Company granted such dis-
counts only to dealers who sold at prices fixed by the company. The complaint
charges that such conduct constitutes price discrimination in violation of § 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act and price-fixing in violation of § 5 of the FTC Act. Texas
Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. § 26754 (1958). It would seem that a price-fixing violation
could be avoided by granting the discounts to all dealers, including those dealers who
refuse to meet, to the extent desired by the company, the price competition provided by
the price-cutting dealers. However, price discrimination difficulties will still exist if
dealers in peripheral areas are either denied the discount or granted a different dis-
count from other dealers. See note 73 infra. The difficulty lies in determining the
extent of the competitive market.
28. See note 18 snupra.
29. See note 8 supra.
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this economic pressure, all seventeen dealers accepted C plans.
According to the testimony the resulting price war lasted several
months, during which time Sun was able to exercise control over the
competitive market price by its use of C plans."0 This assertion seems
to be based upon the ability of Sun to force lower prices throughout the
area by means of its price control over all Sun outlets. The major petro-
leum companies not using consignment did not possess this control, al-
though they could have subsidized their outlets. At least, Sun's action
tended to prevent or hamper the efforts of independents to enter the
market because of the latter's inability to withstand the financial losses
resulting from the price war.81 Sun's use of C plans raises serious ques-
tions of legality under both the Federal Trade Commission Act and the
Sherman Act."8 Furthermore, since permanent C plans could be used in
a similar manner, the questions are not confined to "off and on again"
plans. The considerations determining legality vary according to whether
the consignment contract is between parties who operate on the same or
different levels of distribution.
CONSIGNMENT CONTRACTS INVOLVING HORIZONTAL PRICE-FIXING
A contract which fixes prices between two parties who operate on
the same level of distribution and are competitors is called a horizontal
price-fixing contract. Generally, the economic harm from horizontal
price-fixing contracts is the elimination of the opportunity for price
competition between the parties which creates the danger of arbitrary
and unreasonable prices. As a result, such contracts consistently have
been held to be illegal under both the Sherman and the Federal Trade
Commission Acts where there was either power or intent to affect market
price. 8 Therefore, an important issue is whether or not the parties to a
given consignment contract are competitors.
In the market area involved in the Sun Oil complaint, Sun Oil
owned some retail outlets and made consignment contracts with inde-
30. Hearings on H. Res. 56, pt. 1, supra note 8, at 301.
31. According to the testimony, the market instability in the Norfolk-Portsmouth-
Virginia Beach area was caused by the entrance of new major oil companies who were
attempting to gain a foothold and by the attempts of existing companies to maintain
their share of the market. Id. at 311.
32. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1952). Section 1 of this
act provides in part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. .. ."
33. See, e.g., FTC v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52 (1927);
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); Advertising Specialty
Nat'l Ass'n v. FTC, 238 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1956); Callaghan v. FTC, 163 F.2d 359
(2d Cir. 1947).
NOTES
pendent dealers owning or operating other outlets. The economic rela-
tionship of Sun and its dealers is similar to the relationship of the manu-
facturer and certain wholesalers in the recent case of United States v.
McKesson & Robbins, Inc.,34 a suit to enjoin price-fixing in violation of
the Sherman Act. McKesson, a manufacturer that wholesaled 5
both its own and competitors' brand products, distributed its own
brand products to retailers through three channels: (1) sales by the
manufacturing and wholesale divisions to independent wholesalers who
sold in competition either with the direct sales of the manufacturing di-
vision or with the wholesale divisions; (2) direct sales by the manufac-
turing division; and, (3) sales by the wholesale divisions.
Prior to 1951, McKesson had fair trade agreements with twenty-
one independent wholesalers purchasing directly from the manufacturing
division. Of these independents, sixteen competed with McKesson's
wholesale divisions while the other five competed with the manufactur-
ing division for sales to chain drugstores located in their trading areas.
On June 6, 1951, the McKesson wholesale divisions were notified to
cease selling to any independent wholesaler who had not entered into a
fair trade contract with the manufacturing division. As a result, seventy-
three of the independent wholesalers who had been purchasing from
McKesson wholesale divisions entered into fair trade agreements with
the manufacturing division binding the independents to sell at prices
fixed by the manufacturing division. Each of these independents was
in direct competition with the McKesson wholesale division from which
it purchased. The McKesson manufacturing division and wholesale
divisions were free to sell at prices lower than the minimum prices agreed
upon by the independents.3 "
McKesson contended that its fair trade contracts with independent
wholesalers came within the exemption provided by the Miller-Tydings
Amendment. This amendment provides that nothing contained in Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act
shall render illegal, contracts or agreements prescribing mini-
mum prices for the resale of a commodity which bears, or the
label or container of which bears, the trade mark, brand, or
name of the producer or distributor of such commodity and
which is in free and open competition with commodities of the
same general class produced or distributed by others, when
34. 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
35. Operating through 74 wholesale divisions located in 35 states, McKesson is
the largest drug wholesaler in the United States. Id. at 306.
36. Record, pp. 57-58.
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contracts or agreements of that description are lawful as ap-
plied to intrastate transactions, under any statute, law or public
policy now or hereafter in effect in any State . . . in which
such resale is to be made or to which the commodity is to be
transported for such resale. . . . Provided further, That the
preceding proviso shall not make lawful any contract or agree-
ment, providing for the establishment or maintenance of mini-
mum resale prices on any commodity herein involved, between
brokers, or between factors, or between retailers, or between
persons, firms, or corporations in competition with each other.
37
The Supreme Court held that McKesson and the independent whole-
salers were competitors and that the contracts were, therefore, illegal."
In a more recent case, Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Secatores,
Inc., 9 the parties were held to be competitors even though the company
did not operate outlets in competition with its retail dealers. Esso sought
to enjoin a "non-signer" service station dealer from selling the com-
pany's gasoline at prices less than those established by the company in
fair trade contracts with other dealers. In addition to the sales made to
the defendant and other dealers, Esso sold directly to large commercial
customers in the defendant's market area. The defendant dealer also
sold to large commercial customers. But, as contrasted with the McKes-
son case, the integrated company and the defendant were distributing only
the products of the integrated company.4" Nevertheless, the company
and the defendant were held to be competitors and the company was
denied injunctive relief."
It seems clear from the McKesson and Esso cases that a company
and its dealers will be deemed competitors whenever the company either
operates its own retail stations or sells directly to users within the com-
petitive area of its independent dealers. But, both the McKesson and
Esso cases involved fair trade contracts rather than consignment con-
tracts and appear to have been based primarily on a literal interpretation
of the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Amendments rather than on an
37. 50 Stat. 693 (1937), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
38. 351 U.S. at 313.
39. 246 F.2d 17 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957).
40. The defendant agreed to buy all of its gasoline requirements from Esso Stand-
ard. Id. at 18.
41. Id. at 21-22. The denial of relief extended not only to the sales made to com-
mercial accounts but also to sales made to the general public for which the parties did
not compete. Since the fair trade contracts specified minimum rather than precise retail
prices, the decision as to sales made to the general public cannot be justified upon any
possible economic abuse. Indeed, the court based its decision solely upon a literal in-
terpretation of the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Amendments.
NOTES
analysis of the economic effects resulting from the use of the type of
horizontal price-fixing contract involved. 2 Therefore, the integrated
company situation must be compared with three other types of horizontal
price-fixing contracts to determine whether there is an economically sig-
nificant difference between the use of consignment and fair trade con-
tracts by an integrated company.
The simplest horizontal price-fixing contract is between two or more
parties on the same functional level to fix the price at which they sell.
The relevant market is solely the one in which the contracting parties
formerly competed. Notwithstanding dictum in some cases that price-
fixing contracts are illegal per se,43 the defendants in all of the cases in-
volving this type of contract possessed either the power or the intent to
affect the market price.44 Furthermore, a few courts have stated that
power or intent is essential to render such contracts illegal." However,
the power or intent required will vary with the method used to affect
prices. This point was exemplified by the Supreme Court in United
42. In the McKesson case the court stated: "The issue presented is a narrow one
of statutory interpretation. . . . It has been held too often to require elaboration now
that price fixing is contrary to the policy of competition underlying the Sherman Act
and that its illegality does not depend upon a showing of its unreasonableness, since it
is conclusively presumed to be unreasonable." 351 U.S. at 309-10. "There is no basis
for supposing that Congress, in enacting the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts, intended
any change in the traditional per se doctrine." Id. at 310-11. "Congress thus made as
plain as words can make it that, without regard to categories or labels, the crucial in-
quiry is whether the contracting parties compete with each other. If they do, the Miller-
Tydings and McGuire Acts do not permit them to fix resale prices. . . . Since ap-
pellee [McKesson & Robbins] competes 'at the same functional level' with each of the
94 wholesalers with whom it has price-fixing agreements, the proviso [to the Miller-
tydings and McGuire Acts] prevents these agreements from falling within the statutory
exemption [provided by the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts]." Id. at 313.
"Both the government and appellee press upon us economic arguments which could
reasonably have caused Congress to support their respective positions. We need not
concern ourselves with such speculation. Congress has marked the limitations beyond
which price fixing cannot go." Id. at 315-16.
In the Esso case the court stated: "The critical, and as we see it the controlling,
question before the court below and before us is whether the plaintiff [Esso] and de-
fendant [the dealer] are 'corporations in competition with each other.'" 246 F.2d at 19.
"Although their [the parties] techniques of doing business differ, they are nonetheless
competitors, and this excludes application of the exemption from antitrust legislation."
Id. at 21.
43. E.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) ; United
States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945) ; United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273
U.S. 392 (1927). See generally Comment, The Per Se Illegality of Price-Fixing-Sans
Power, Purpose, or Effect, 19 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 837, 848-64 (1952).
44. E.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); FTC v.
Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52 (1927) ; United States v. Trenton Pot-
teries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
45. E.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) ; Maryland & Virginia Milk Pro-
ducers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 193 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,46 when it stated:
Where the machinery for price-fixing is an agreement on the
prices to be charged or paid for the commodity in the interstate
or foreign channels of trade, the power to fix prices exists if
the combination has control of a substantial part of the com-
merce in that commodity. Where the means for price-fixing
are purchases or sales of the commodity in a market operation
or as here, purchases of a part of the supply of the commodity
for the purpose of keeping it from having a depressive effect
on the markets, such power may be found to exist though the
combination does not control a substantial part of the com-
modity. In such a case that power may be established if as a
result of market conditions, the resources available to the com-
binations, the timing and the strategic placement of orders and
the like, effective means are at hand to accomplish the desired
objective. But there may be effective influence over the mar-
ket though the group in question does not control it."
The actual or potential economic harm from such contracts is their
tendency to lessen or eliminate price competition and to create the danger
of an arbitrary and unreasonable market price.4" Therefore, a rule of
per se illegality is unnecessary in situations where the parties do not have
such power or intent. Admittedly, most agreements of this type will be
made between parties possessing the requisite power or intent.
A second type of price-fixing contract which is essentially horizontal
is an agreement between dealers competing on one level of distribution
to coerce resale price maintenance contracts from a manufacturing or
producing company. The relevant market is the competitive market of
the dealers for sales of the company's product. The horizontal agree-
ment creates the danger of two adverse economic effects.4" First, the
agreement, which stems from the dealer's desire not to compete in price,
may result in an arbitrary and unreasonable price whenever the coercing
46. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
47. Id. at 223-24.
48. If there is no intent to affect or no actual effect on the market price, as con-
trasted with the price of the contracting parties, the contract or combination will be up-
held. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). The intent or
actual effect on market price occurs when the purpose or effect of the agreement is to
raise, lower or stabilize the market price. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
49. United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, Inc., 179 F.2d
426 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 831 (1949); Anchor Hocking Glass Corp. v.
FTC, 33 F.T.C. 547, petition for review dismissed, 124 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1941);
Standard Oil of Kentucky, 8 F.T.C. 74 (1924).
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dealers control the market and execute similar agreements with other
competing companies. Second, if competition between the dealers would
cause a lower price for the coerced manufacturer's product than for
other manufacturers' products, the dealers might be able to sell a greater
volume of the company's product than would be possible under a fair
trade price; but, the company is forced by the fair trade contract to
abandon this possibility. Such a possibility is important in industries
such as the petroleum industry where advance estimates of demand fre-
quently result in overproduction. "° The possibility of such effects is
recognized by the McGuire Amendment which provides that the exemp-
tion for minimum or stipulated"' resale price-fixing contracts does not
apply to contracts between parties in competition with each other. "2  In
view of the nature of this type of contract, the per se rule is properly
applied.
A third type of horizontal price-fixing contract involves an agree-
ment between two or more companies to fix the minimum, maximum, or
precise resale price of their dealers who are competing on another func-
tional level. The relevant market is the market in which the dealers sell.
The economic harm in that market is the creation of an artificial floor or
ceiling on price competition or the complete elimination of price competi-
tion between the dealers of the contracting parties. Similar to the second
type of horizontal contract, these contracts are denied the protection of
the McGuire Amendment by the proviso that the fair trade exemption
does not apply to contracts between parties in competition with each
other. If the objective of a company is the maintenance of reasonable
dealer margins and resale price maintenance is not feasible, the company
has the alternative of distributing its products through its own outlets.
However, the Supreme Court has held that even when companies are le-
gally precluded from distributing a certain commodity, an agreement be-
tween two such companies to fix the maximum resale prices of their in-
dependent distributors is illegal."
50. See H. R. REP. No. 1423, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1955).
51. For a discussion of the interpretation given to this term, see text accompany-
ing note 69 infra.
52. 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (Supp. 1957).
53. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951). The most
complete statement of facts appears in the opinion by the Court of Appeals, 182 F.2d
228 (7th Cir. 1950). This case involved an action by a liquor wholesaler for treble
damages resulting from a violation of the Sherman Act. The defendants, Seagram and
Calvert, were competing distillers selling to Kiefer-Stewart and other independent
wholesalers. An Indiana statute precluded distillers from distributing their own
products. The termination of the war and OPA gave Indiana wholesalers an oppor-
tunity to increase margins greatly reduced by wartime taxation by means of concerted
activity. Following a meeting of the Indiana Wholesale Liquor Dealers Association in
October 1946, attended by Kiefer-Stewart, the Indiana wholesalers filed identical
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The foregoing types of horizontal price-fixing contracts provide a
guide for the comparison of resale price maintenance and non-agency
consignment contracts between an integrated manufacturing or producing
company and its independent dealers who are competing with company-
operated retail outlets. The relevant market is the competitive market in
which the dealers and company-operated outlets compete for sales of the
integrated company's product. The danger of adverse economic effects
results from the fact that the price-fixing of the integrated company de-
prives its independent dealers of the opportunity to compete in price with
the retail outlets of the company. The company can fix the prices at a
level higher than the competitive price in order to protect inefficient
company-operated outlets from the competition of independent dealers
schedules of increased prices with state authorities. The new prices were arrived at by
computing the customary fifteen per cent wholesale mark-up on the basis of costs, in-
cluding taxes. Under OPA regulations the basis excluded taxes.
Seagram decided that increased prices were not in its best interest because of a
declining post-war consumer market. See Business Week, July 9, 1949, p. 25. Ac-
cordingly, Seagram expended over $500,000 on advertisements against inflated whisky
prices. Business Week, Nov. 16, 1946, p. 50. Seagram, however, did not wish to alien-
ate liquor retailers because of their ability to influence consumers' brand choices. See
Comment, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 837, 841 (1952). Therefore, Seagram notified Indiana
wholesalers that wholesale prices would remain at the OPA level. Upon the concerted
refusal by the wholesalers to comply with this order, Seagram suspended all shipments
to Indiana wholesalers, including Kiefer-Stewart. Prior to this time Calvert, a wholly
owned subsidiary of Seagram, had concluded negotiations giving Kiefer-Stewart a
Calvert distributorship. After Seagram's action, Calvert assured Kiefer-Stewart that
their relationship would be unaffected by the increased prices. A few days later, No-
vember 19, 1946, Calvert cancelled the distributorship. The jury concluded that this
cancellation was the result of an agreement with Seagram. On February 3, 1947, all
the wholesalers but Kiefer-Stewart filed notification with state authorities of their re-
turn to the OPA method of computing mark-ups.
Kiefer-Stewart claimed that as a result of the agreement between Seagram and
Calvert to fix the resale prices of wholesalers, Kiefer-Stwart had lost the Seagram
and Calvert lines of products, with consequent damage to its business. The Supreme
Court held that as this agreement between competitors imposed the same restraint as an
agreement between competitors to fix minimum resale prices, it was illegal and Kiefer-
Stewart was entitled to damages. 340 U.S. at 213.
One writer has suggested that this decision eliminates the power or intent require-
ment. Comment, supra at 864. However, the defendants did have the power and intent
to affect prices in the wholesalers' market which was the relevant market. The ex-
istence of a legally objectionable harm in this market, however, is not entirely clear.
The wholesalers remained free to sell below the maximum prices. In addition, the
competition in the whisky industry is typically non-price competition. If distillers act-
ing individually were unable to effectuate such maximum price-fixing contracts, the
decision deprived them of their only effective weapon against the monopolistic power
of their distributors. As a result, the argument could be made that any such restraint
imposed by this agreement would not justify the Kiefer-Stewart decision unless the dis-
tillers acting individually could have effectuated such agreements. Perhaps the diffi-
culty of determining the individual distillers power in this respect legally justified the
application of the rule of per se illegality. See Comment, supra at 864-68. But, in the
absence of a statute precluding a distiller or other producer from distributing its own
products, a sufficient economic harm for the agreement to be deemed illegal would
definitely exist.
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without the necessity of subsidizing the company outlets.5 ' On the other
hand, the company can fix the dealers' prices extremely low in order to
establish a market price which will tend to prevent the entrance of new
companies into the market area or cause the disappearance of financially
weaker existing companies. Finally, whatever the price level, the com-
pany can undersell its independent dealers either by making direct sales
through the manufacturing division to large volume customers at prices
lower than the fair trade or consignment prices at which the dealers must
sell or by excluding company-operated outlets from the provisions of the
fair trade or consignment contracts enabling them to undersell the inde-
pendent dealers."5
The danger of these effects would seem to be present whether the
contract is one which sets the resale prices of the dealers, held to be illegal
in the McKesson case, or which merely eliminates passage of title enabl-
ing the integrated company to set the retail prices. The technical prop-
erty distinction between the two contracts generally recognized for other
purposes should not obscure this fact. Furthermore, consignment would
seem to be a more flexible method of instigating price disturbances in
order to stabilize or increase a company's share of total market sales.
Finally, consignment contracts confer the possibility of greater control
over prices than fair trade contracts in the thirty states where fair trade
is confined to the fixing of minimum prescribed prices."
As a consignment contract itself merely confers the controls of in-
tegration over price without actually establishing all of the responsibilities
of full integration, the potential adverse effects of such a contract indi-
cate that it should be deemed an illegal price control device. However, if
the responsibilities of the outlet are assumed and if legitimate business
purposes exist for the use of consignment, integration in the form of
an agency system of distribution has actually occurred. In such a situa-
tion most of the adverse effects resulting from the use of consignment
no longer exist." Since the remaining effects occur with all forms of
54. In the McKesson case the Government argued this possibility as a reason for
denying legality to fair trade contracts used by any integrated company. The Court re-
fused to consider any of the economic arguments made by the parties. 351 U.S. at 316.
55. See Ibid. where the Government made the same argument with regard to direct
sales by the manufacturing division of an integrated company. However, the Govern-
ment apparently failed to mention the possibility of underselling retailers through the
wholesale divisions (or retail outlets) when the latter are excluded from the provisions
of the fair trade contracts, as were the McKesson wholesale divisions. Record, pp. 57-58.
56. Fifteen of the remaining states permit fair trade contracts which stipulate the
precise resale price. The other three states do not have fair trade acts. See 1 TRADE
Ra. REP. ff 3003 (1958).
57. The possibility of prices being fixed at a low level in order to prevent or
hamper the entrance of new companies or to eliminate financially weaker existing com-
panies will still exist.
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vertical integration, the use of consignment should be considered lawful
unless vertical integration itself is to be prevented."
When a permanent C plan is used, the problem involves a determina-
tion of the extent to which the responsibilities must be assumed before a
genuine agency is recognized. More responsibilities should be assumed
before an agency is recognized for antitrust purposes than for other le-
gal purposes because of the potential adverse economic effects which may
occur. The legitimate reasons, under the antitrust laws, for the use of
consignment do not seem to require that any of the economically signifi-
cant responsibilities be assumed by the consignee-dealer. Therefore, in
view of the fact that the integrated company is eliminating the independ-
ence of its former retail competitors, it would seem proper to require the
integrated company to assume all the economically significant responsi-
bilities.
In the case of an "off and on again" plan the problem is different
as there is no legitimate business purpose, under the antitrust laws, for
its use which could not be achieved without controlling dealers' prices."
The main purpose for its use is, therefore, a desire to control such prices.
As a result, such C plans should never be considered as creating an agency
but should be considered merely as an illegal price control device.
The foregoing discussion has indicated the relevant market and the
adverse economic effects which may occur therein when an integrated
manufacturer makes either non-agency consignment or fair trade con-
tracts with its independent dealers. It remains to determine only whether
the potential harm is such that a per se rule should be applied in all cases,
or as has been suggested,6" only when the integrated company is retailing
(or wholesaling) both its own and other companies' products."' The
suggested limitation is posited upon an assumption that an integrated
company which does not distribute the products of other companies
would lose profit due to decreased total sales by all its dealers, which
would offset any benefits resulting to its own outlets from a consignment
58. An argument could be made that a manufacturer should not be allowed to
compete with the independent distributors of its own and other competing manufacturers'
products. Such competition enables the integrated manufacturer to stabilize both the
retail and the manufacturing market in the same manner as consignment. The argu-
ments on both sides on the issues of vertical integration and divorcement, however, are
too complex and detailed to be considered herein. See generally Bork, Vertical Integra-
tion and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of An. Economic Misconception, 22 U.
Cm. L. REv. 157 (1954).
59. See text accompanying note 22-23 supra.
60. Comment, 24 U. Ci. L. REv. 533, 542 (1957). Compare the view taken in
Note, 64 YALE L. J. 426, 431-34 (1955).
61. Under this reasoning the Esso decision would have to be considered erroneous.
See text accompanying notes 40, 41 supra.
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or fair trade price higher than the price which would exist under competi-
tive conditions. As a result, such an integrated company would not
have any greater incentive for making fair trade or non-agency con-
signment contracts than a non-integrated company. This analysis as-
sumes certain market conditions which do not always exist.
It is true that the integrated company which does not distribute the
products of other companies would not have any additional incentive to
make such contracts when the total demand for its product is such that an
increased price will result in decreased volume. But, the demand for the
individual company's product may be sufficiently inelastic because of
such factors as product differentiation, station location, and station ap-
pearance that slightly increased (or decreased) prices will not substan-
tially affect total sales. 2 However, a similar price difference between
various outlets for the same product might have an adverse effect on the
sales of the individual outlets. The extent of the effect would depend,
among other factors, upon knowledge by the purchasers of the various
prices of the individual outlets and the ability of purchasers to seek the
lower prices. Thus, in some cases, the integrated company could use
such contracts to maintain inefficient outlets which, unless deficit-
financed by the company, would lose sales to independent outlets selling
at lower prices. In addition, to the extent that the integrated company
is the price leader of the industry, the company would have an additional
incentive whenever the demand for the entire industry production is not
inversely related to the industry price. Therefore, in order to determine
whether the use of such contracts by an integrated company which
does not distribute the products of other companies could result in ad-
verse economic effects, a court would have to make a detailed analysis
of the economic conditions in each defendant's industry. As the purpose
of the per se rule is to preclude the need for making such detailed analyses,
both initially and periodically to determine if conditions have changed,"3
the per se rule should be applied in such cases. The remaining inquiry
involves a determination of the effect on the legality of C plans when
the company is not a competitor of its dealers.
CONSIGNMENT CONTRACTS INVOLVING VERTICAL PRICE-FIXING
When a company neither operates any retail outlets nor makes any
direct sales in a dealer's competitive area, the C plan is between non-
competing parties on different functional levels and is termed "vertical."
62. See BAIN, PRICE THEORY 273, 305-06 (1952) ; 1 BAIN, THE EcoNoMICS OF THE
PACIFIC COAST PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 197-201 (1944).
63. Compare United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 398-99 (1927)
with United States v. McKesson & Robbins, 351 U.S. 305, 315-16 (1956).
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Vertical price-fixing contracts may result in two adverse economic ef-
fects. First, the contracts tend to eliminate competition between the
dealers as to the manufacturing company's product. Second, in oligopoly
markets it is probably true that vertical price-fixing contracts facilitate
horizontal price-fixing at the manufacturing level.64 To prevent these
adverse effects the Supreme Court has held vertical price-fixing contracts
to be illegal under both the Sherman and Federal Trade Commission
Acts in the absence of a genuine agency relationship between the company
and its dealers.65 However, a substantial exemption from this general rule
of illegality has been made for resale price maintenance contracts by the
Miller-Tydings and McGuire Amendments. The first important issue
is whether consignment contracts are within the protection afforded by
these amendments.
The McGuire Amendment, which extends the exemption provided
by the Miller-Tydings Amendment, provides in part:
Nothing . . . in any of the Antitrust Acts shall render un-
lawful any contracts or agreements prescribing minimum or
stipulated prices . . for the resale of a commodity which
bears, or the label or container of which bears, the trade-mark,
brand, or name of the producer or distributor of such com-
modity . . . when contracts or agreements of that description
are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions under any stat-
ute, law, or public policy . . . in any State . . . in which such
resale is to be made ... .66
At least four problems of interpretation arise when this language is
applied to C plans. These problems involve the meaning of "container,"
"stipulated prices," "any contracts," and "resale of a commodity." The
recent case of United States v. Socony-Mobil Oil Co.6" provides authority
as to the meaning of the first three of these terms. The district court held
that sales from service station pumps bearing the brand name of the
company and pumping gasoline from underground tanks came within the
meaning of the word "container" as used in the McGuire Amendment. 8
In dismissing the indictment, the court held that an allegation that the
company had set the precise resale prices of its dealers did not amount to a
violation of the antitrust laws because such conduct constituted merely the
64. See Comment, supra note 53 at 864-68.
65. E.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); FTC v.
Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
66. 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (Supp. 1957).
67. 150 F. Supp. 202 (D. Mass. 1957), appeal dismissed, 356 U.S. 925 (1958).
68. Id. at 203-04.
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setting of "stipulated prices" within the language of the McGuire Amend-
ment.6 An allegation that the prescribed prices were non-uniform be-
tween dealers was also held to be insufficient because the protection af-
forded by the amendment extends to all resale price-fixing contracts
protected by state law and not merely to fair trade contracts which pre-
scribe uniform resale prices."0 Assuming that the district court is cor-
rect, the difficult question with regard to the applicability of this amend-
ment to C plans is whether consignment contracts involve the "resale of
a commodity." Generally, a company's retention of title by means of
consignment results in only one sale, which is made between the company
and the consumer (who receives title directly from the company rather
than from the consignee-dealer who effects the transfer of possession).
Therefore, it would seem that consignment contracts cannot properly be
considered as contracts for "resale" within the exemption provided by
the McGuire Amendment.
Assuming that consignment contracts are not protected by the ex-
emption, a second issue is whether the exemption should be extended by
analogy to consignment contracts. The argument for such an extension
would be that consignment contracts have the same effects as contracts
which stipulate non-uniform resale prices."' Both contracts may result
in two adverse effects in addition to those which tend to result from all
vertical price-fixing contracts." First, the control over the prices of se-
lected dealers enables the company to exert downward pressure on retail
market prices in selected areas in order to stabilize prices and to maintain
the status quo in market shares. Second, both contracts may be used to
achieve price discrimination among the dealers without violating the pro-
visions of the Robinson-Patman Act."
69. Id. at 204.
70. Ibid.
71. See note 8 supra.
72. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
73. See note 21 supra where these provisions are quoted. Discrimination may oc-
cur even though the dealers receive the same margin or commission because of the
greater volume which will accrue to the "lower-priced" dealer. See Enterprise Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957). In the
Socony-Mobil case the company apparently was using price control to "meet competi-
tion." Although "meeting competition" is a defense to a charge of price discrimination
under the Robinson-Patman Act, the propriety of such defense is quite controversial
when it allows a company to stabilize market shares. In such cases effective price com-
petition no longer exists. The adoption of the amendment proposed in S. 11, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) would probably eliminate this objection. But see Carlston,
Senate Bill No. i and Antitrust Policy, 11 VAND. L. Rxv. 129 (1957). But, the main
objection to the extension of this defense to resale price-fixing or consignment contracts
is that the control conferred over the prices of otherwise independent dealers is un-
necessary for a company to "meet competition." In the absence of such control the
company's independent dealers are competing with the dealers of other companies as
well as with each other. If the company desires to eliminate the competition between its
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The legality of contracts prescribing non-uniform resale prices,
however, is not free from doubt. The district court in the Socony-Mobil
case based its decision of legality on a literal interpretation of the Mc-
Guire Amendment. Consideration of the legislative purposes underlying
both the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Amendments probably would have
produced a different result. The purposes were to protect independent
dealers from the "loss-leader" selling of chain-dealers and to protect the
goodwill of the manufacturer's trade-mark or brand name from such
price-cutting." Fair trade contracts effectuate such purposes. But,
contracts prescribing non-uniform prices create the threat to the inde-
pendent dealer of his manufacturer prescribing lower prices for sales by
competing dealers and are unnecessary for the protection of the good-
will of the manufacturer's trade-mark or brand name. Consideration
of the effects of the two types of resale price-fixing agreements also
refutes the Socony-Mobil decision. Fair trade contracts are not as sus-
ceptible to market control as contracts which prescribe non-uniform re-
sale prices and cannot be used to achieve price discrimination between
dealers. Nevertheless, protection of fair trade agreements is highly con-
troversial and considered by some to be an unwarranted departure from
free competition.5 Therefore, the amendments should be interpreted as
protecting only fair trade contracts. Such an interpretation would pre-
clude extension of the exemption to consignment contracts since, as men-
tioned above, such contracts may have the same adverse effects as con-
tracts which prescribe non-uniform resale prices.
Finally, as in the case of horizontal consignment contracts, the use
of consignment may be legal if the company assumes sufficient responsi-
bilities of the dealer to justify the recognition of an agency relationship
dealers and intensify the competition with the dealers of other companies, the company
can and should integrate by assuming the business responsibilities of its dealers, and
thereby suffer the costs of "meeting competition." A company should not be allowed to
meet the competition of other dealers unless the company is a direct competitor of such
dealers.
74. See citations to legislative reports and other authorities collected in 10 STAN.
L. REv. 553 nn.12-17 (1958).
75. See ATT'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 153-54 (1955) which recom-
mends repeal of the fair trade exemption. A similar position has been taken by the De-
partment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. Id. at 153 n.90. A discussion of
abuses resulting from the exemption is contained in Comment, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 837,
865-67 (1952). On the other hand, the exemption has had the vigorous support of
powerful organized retailers and manufacturers' groups. See FTC, REPORT ON RESALE
PRICE MAINTENANCE 39-64 (1945). An interesting discussion of other forms of price
maintenance with a suggestion that the "free and open competition" proviso of the fair
trade exemption be extended to these other forms and be more vigorously enforced as
to fair trade can be found in Adams, Resale Price Maintenance: Fact and Fancy, 64
YALE L. J. 967 (1955).
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for purposes of antitrust law. In United States v. General Electric Co."8
the Supreme Court sustained the use of consignment contracts because
the contracts were a part of a genuine agency system of distribution.
The Court has refused to recognize an agency, however, where the con-
tracts are merely a subterfuge for price control" even though the dealers
are called "agents."7 " The extent of the business responsibilities which
must be assumed before the Court will recognize a genuine agency is
indicated by the General Electric case.
In this case the Government contended that General Electric's system
of distributing lamps was illegal under the Sherman Act because it en-
abled the company to fix the resale price of lamps in the hands of inde-
pendent dealers. Lamps were consigned to the dealers with title remain-
ing in General Electric. Transportation to the dealers was paid by Gen-
eral Electric. The dealers received fixed commissions from the proceeds
of their sales which were made at prices fixed by General Electric. The
dealers assumed all credit risks and all expenses of storage (including
rent and other overhead expenses), handling, sale and distribution.
Although the lamps were subject to return upon the demand of
General Electric, the dealers assumed the risk of all lost or damaged
lamps while in their custody. However, General Electric paid the insur-
ance and taxes on the lamps and assumed all risk of fire, flood, obsoles-
cence and price decline.
The Supreme Court held that these consignment contracts created
genuine agencies and were, therefore, not a violation of the antitrust
laws.7" The fact that the agents were independent wholesale and retail
merchants in their regular business who had purchased as such from
General Electric prior to the contracts was considered irrelevant. The
Court distinguished the earlier case of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park &
Sons Co.S" in which a purported agency was held to be merely a subter-
fuge and illegal. In the Dr. Miles case the only agency element was the
control by the manufacturer of its dealers' minimum resale prices. In ad-
dition to stressing the failure of the manufacturer to control the absolute
selling price of the dealers or to assume any agency responsibilities, the
Court, in the Dr. Miles case, emphasized the existence of interlocking re-
strictions upon sales made between the dealers which could not be based
76. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
77. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
78. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942). In this case a price-fixing
agreement between competitors was held illegal notwithstanding the reference in the
agreement to some of the parties as "agents."
79. Id. at 485-86.
80. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
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upon any agency relationship."' Such restrictions were not present in the
General Electric case.
In the General Electric case the consignment contracts were part of
a permanent agency arrangement. The case indicates that when consign-
ment involves vertical price-fixing, an agency will be recognized if some-
of the economically significant responsibilities of the consignee-dealer
are assumed. The nature of the responsibilities essential for the creation
of an agency would seem to vary from case to case. For example, more
than 50 per cent of all service station dealers lease their stations from
either their supplier or a third person.8 2 The monthly payment of rent
is a significant risk of doing business which the courts might conclude
should be assumed by the company. However, if the dealer pays rent on
a straight gallonage basis, the risk to the dealer of not being able to cover
this expense from the sales of any given month no longer exists. In
such a situation, rent would not even be a relevant factor. Similarly, the
employees might be on a salary or commission basis making labor ex-
penses variable.
The reasoning of the General Electric case does not seem applicable
to the use of "off and on again" C plans. An agency is recognized for the
purpose of allowing a company to achieve business purposes which are
legitimate under the antitrust laws. But, as in the case of horizontal
consignment contracts, "off and on again" C plans between parties on
vertical levels are used solely as a device for price control. There is no
justification, therefore, for the recognition of an agency in connection
with such C plans regardless of the extent of the consignee-dealer's ex-
penses which a company is willing to incur for the achievement of its illi-
cit purpose.
In summary, since consignment contracts involve price-fixing and
are not protected by the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Amendments, the
validity of consignment contracts appears to depend upon the recognition
of a genuine agency relationship in connection with the contracts. An
agency should not be recognized in connection with the use of an "off
and on again" C plan regardless of the extent to which business re-
sponsibilities of the consignee-dealer are assumed because the main pur-
pose of such plans is price control. On the other hand, the existence of
other purposes for the use of a permanent C plan demands that recogni-
tion depend only upon the extent to which such responsibilities are as-
sumed. If a few economically significant responsibilities of the consignee-
dealer are assumed in connection with the permanent plan of a company
81. Id. at 398-400.
82. See note 5 supra.
NOTES
which does not compete with its consignee-dealer, an agency will probably
be recognized. But, when the company is integrated and competes with
its consignee-dealer, it would seem that an agency relationship should be
recognized only if the company assumes all of the economically signifi-
cant responsibilities of the dealer.
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:
LIBERAL JOINDER OF ISSUES AND THE SEQUENCE OF TRIAL
Prior to the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,1
legal and equitable issues appeared together in a single action only to a
limited extent.2  When the situation did arise, the rule followed in the
federal courts was to try the equitable issues first, and then if any legal
issues remained for trial, a jury was impaneled.' The reasons for this
practice were largely historical, stemming from the old rivalry between
law and equity when the chancellor might enjoin an action at law pend-
ing determination of a related suit in equity.4
The Federal Rules, however, have made it possible for all legal and
equitable issues pertaining to a claim to appear in a single action; either
where the plaintiff joins legal and equitable issues as independent or al-
ternative claims, or where the defendant interposes an equitable counter-
claim or defense in a legal action or a legal counterclaim or defense in
an equitable action.' These liberal joinder provisions, although adminis-
tratively advantageous, have been attacked as procedural pitfalls which
1. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated by the Supreme Court
on December 20, 1937, and became effective September 16, 1938. The Rules were
amended in 1939, 1946, 1948 and 1951.
2. The Law and Equity Act of 1915 authorized the interposition of an equitable
defense or counterclaim in an action at law, but it was not until the adoption of the
Federal Rules that a legal counterclaim could properly be interposed in a suit in equity.
5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 39.12 (2d ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as MooRE].
3. Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon National Bank, 260 U.S. 235 (1922).
4. Commentary, Sequence of Trial of Legal and Equitable Issues, 7 FED. RUiEs
SERV. 970 (1944).
5. "The plaintiff in his complaint or in a reply setting forth a counterclaim and
the defendant in an answer setting forth a counterclaim may join either as independent
or alternative claims as many claims either legal or equitable or both as he may have
against an opposing party. . . ." FED. R. Cirv. P. 18(a). See also FED. R. CIrv. P.
13(a) which states, "A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the
time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim
and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction. .. ."
